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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-2-20) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b)(1), Appellee / Plaintiff 
Thomas Peck ("Mr. Peck") hereby sets forth the issue on appeal because the "Issue 
Presented" by Appellant State of Utah (the "State") is confusing and misleading due to 
the State's improper omission of relevant portions of the statute at issue. The proper 
issue in this appeal is as follows: 
Did the trial court properly rule that the State did not retain immunity 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 63-30d-301(5)0) (2004)1 because Mr. 
Peck's injury did not arise out of "incarceration in any state prison, county 
or city jail, or other place of legal confinement"? 
Standard of Review: "[A] trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law that [Appellate Courts] review for correctness." Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, ^ 8, 
48 P.3d 949. 
1
 The relevant statutory provision was formerly cited as Utah Code Ann. Section 63-30-
10 (10). For the Court's convenience, Mr. Peck has cited to the current version of the 
statute, which is substantially the same as the former version. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Peck was seriously injured after being arrested and handcuffed by two State 
troopers, but before being placed in the police car or transported to jail. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The State moved on two separate occasions to dismiss Mr. Peck's claims on 
grounds of sovereign immunity, but the trial court denied both motions. This Court 
granted the State's petition for interlocutory appeal on April 20, 2007. 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
For purposes of this appeal, the following facts are accepted as true: 
1. On September 17, 2002, two Utah Highway Patrol troopers arrested Mr. 
Peck for driving under the influence of alcohol. Complaint, m 7-11, 36, attached hereto 
as Appellee's Addendum A. (R. 2-3, 7). 
2. After being taken into custody, Mr. Peck was placed in handcuffs behind 
his back. Complaint, ^ 11. (R. 3). 
3. The troopers then ordered Mr. Peck to stand in front of their vehicle while 
the rear seat of the vehicle was cleared to create space for Mr. Peck to sit for transport to 
jail. Complaint, 112. (R. 3). 
4. Mr. Peck stood in front of the vehicle but did not face the vehicle. 
Complaint 113. (R. 3). 
665 36688W1 
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5. Because Mr. Peck did not stand facing the vehicle, a trooper shouted at him 
and "took physical action" to force him to face the vehicle while he stood in front of it. 
Complaint, H 13-14. (R. 3). 
6. Mr. Peck shouted in reply to the trooper, at which time the trooper 
"physically forced" him to the ground. Complaint, «|ffl 15, 29. (R. 3, 5). 
7. While physically forcing Mr. Peck to the ground, the trooper "lost physical 
control of Plaintiff which resulted in Plaintiff falling to the ground on his face." 
Complaint, 1f 15. (R. 3). 
8. Officer Justin Hansen reported that "when [Mr. Peck] started at me again I 
decided to take him to the ground for my safety. With the weather and the recent severe 
rain storm the cement parking lot was very slick. When I began to take him to the ground 
my feet began to slip, when I began to slip I was unable to hold him up so that he would 
not hit the ground very hard." Incident Report of Officer Hansen, attached hereto as 
Appellee's Addendum B. (R. 48-49). 
9. Officer William R. Shrader, Jr. reported that "Trooper Hansen intended to 
take [Mr. Peck] to the ground to gain control of him. The concrete was wet from the rain 
at the time. As Trooper Hansen spun [Mr. Peck] around, [Mr. Peck's] feet slipped out 
from underneath him and he fell head first on the ground, striking his forehead on cement 
and went unconscious." Incident Report of Officer Shrader, attached hereto as 
Appellee's Addendum C. (R. 51-53). 
10. Mr. Peck sustained injuries as a result of the fall. Complaint, ^ 17. (R. 3). 
3 
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11. Mr. Peck has sued the State because the troopers "negligently allowed 
[him] to fall on his face." Complaint, Tf 31. (R. 6). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The statute at issue provides that governmental entities are immune from suit for 
any injury arising out of, or in connection with, "the incarceration of any person in any 
state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement." U.C.A. § 63-30d-
301(5)Q (2004). The State's argument that it is immune in this case hinges on its claim 
that it retains immunity for any injury that arises out of any incarceration or confinement. 
The State's interpretation would essentially eliminate the statutory requirement that the 
injury arise out of "incarceration in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place 
of legal confinement" for the provision to apply. Had the Legislature intended for 
governmental entities to retain immunity for injuries arising out of incarceration 
anywhere, or arising out of arrest generally, the Legislature could have, and would have, 
stated so explicitly. 
Using well-established doctrines of statutory construction, the trial court ruled that 
the statute in this case clearly limits the immunity of the State to injuries arising out of 
incarceration in a physical facility owned and controlled by the State. The injury in this 
case occurred in a public parking lot while Mr. Peck was being arrested for allegedly 
driving under the influence of alcohol. The injury did not arise out of incarceration in 
any physical facility owned or operated by the State. None of the cases cited by the State 
support its argument that the statute should be interpreted so broadly as to provide 
665 366881vl 
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immunity for injuries arising out of any legal incarceration, or as the State apparently 
contends, for any injury incident to arrest. Accordingly, the order of the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE STATE HAS 
NOT RETAINED IMMUNITY IN THIS CASE 
A. The State's Interpretation of the Statute Expands the Immunity 
Provided by the Legislature By Eliminating an Explicit Limitation on 
that Immunity. 
The State's interpretation of the immunity statute eliminates a specific requirement 
deliberately imposed by the Legislature for the application of that immunity. According 
to the State, all that is required for the immunity provision to apply is that Mr. Peck was 
"incarcerated," which it defines as being under state control and not free to leave. The 
Legislature, however, specifically limited the application of this provision to claims 
arising out of "incarceration in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal 
confinement." U.C.A. § 63-30d-301(5)(j). 
According to the State's interpretation of the statute, a "place of legal 
confinement" means any place - whether it be a jail, street corner, or even inside a 
person's car during a traffic stop - so long as the person is not free to leave. Thus, the 
State argues that the statutory immunity applies because Mr. Peck was "under arrest and 
in police custody . . . and 'could not be released without some kind of permission.'" 
Applt. Brief, p. 10. Had the Legislature intended such a broad meaning, however, it 
would have stated so explicitly, or simply provided immunity for injuries arising out of 
5 
665 ;366881vl 
"incarceration," "arrest," or "confinement." Instead, the Legislature limited the State's 
immunity to those injuries arising out of incarceration in three specifically delineated 
"places of legal confinement," all of which constitute physical facilities owned and 
controlled by the State, and "other places of legal confinement," i.e., other places like 
those specifically listed. 
In effect, the State's argument would remove the "place of legal confinement" 
requirement from the statute altogether, and require only "incarceration" or 
"confinement" for immunity. That interpretation, however, would violate the axiom that 
courts "avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or 
inoperative." Hall v. Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, f 15, 24 P.3d 958. In this case, the 
State's offered interpretation should be rejected because it would render a specific portion 
of the statute, that the person be incarcerated "in any state prison, county or city jail, or 
other place of legal confinement," superfluous or inoperative. 
The State's interpretation would rewrite the statute to expand the State's immunity 
beyond incidents arising out of incarceration in a place of legal confinement to provide 
immunity for injuries that arise out of virtually any citizen-police encounter where the 
person is not free to leave. The statute does not provide immunity for incidents arising 
out of the arrest of a person, however, and it must be assumed that the Legislature chose 
its words carefully and for their meaning and did not intend for "incarceration in a place 
665 36688W1 
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of legal confinement" to be interpreted the same as incident to arrest. See Savage Indus., 
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991) ("[i]n construing 
legislative enactments, the reviewer assumes that each term in the statute was used 
advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable."). Here, the plain and unambiguous language of 
the statute unequivocally states that immunity is only retained for injuries arising out of 
incarceration in "a state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement," 
not simply out of arrest. 
B. The State Fails to Address the Trial Court's Ruling that the General 
Phrase "Other Places of Legal Confinement" Should be Interpreted by 
Reference to the Specific Phrases that Precede it 
The State utterly fails to address the trial court's primary basis for its ruling - that 
the general phrase "other place of legal confinement," must be interpreted by reference to 
the specific phrases that precede it. In determining legislative intent, the trial court relied 
on the canon of statutory construction known as "ejusdem generis." Applt. Addendum A, 
at 2. Under that canon, "when a statute contains a list of specific words that relate to a 
certain type of item and those words are followed by a general word, the general word 
should be 'construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects 
enumerated by the preceding specific words.'" State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17, }^13, 133 
2
 Arrest is defined under the Utah Code as "an actual restraint of the person arrested or 
submission to custody." U.C.A. § 77-7-1 (1980). That definition clearly differs from the 
relevant phrase used in Utah Code Ann. Section 63-30d-301(5)(j). 
7 
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P.3d 396 (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 47:17, at 
273-274 (6th ed. 2001)). 
Thus, the general catch-all phrase "other place of legal confinement" must be 
interpreted consistent with the specific phrases that precede it. Because all the specific 
phrases that precede "other place of legal confinement" refer to physical facilities owned 
and operated by a governmental entity, the trial court properly ruled that "other places of 
legal confinement" must refer to "physical facilities] owned and controlled by the State." 
Applt. Addendum A, at 4. 
The State ignores the trial court's reasoning, and instead modifies the legislation 
through the use of ellipses to eliminate all the defining phrases that were deliberately 
chosen by the Legislature. Indeed, the State eliminates those specific phrases from its 
quotation of the statute in multiple places, apparently assuming that the specific phrases 
are unimportant. See Applt. Brief, pp. 2, 6. The specific phrases, however, are the 
definitive examples provided by the Legislature of the "places of legal confinement" 
referred to in the legislation. By eliminating those specific phrases that the Legislature 
intended to serve as comparisons for the phrase "other place of legal confinement," the 
State significantly alters the meaning of the statute. 
The State contends that the phrase "other place of legal confinement" could be 
interpreted without any reference whatsoever to the "other" definitive examples of places 
of legal confinement that precede it. Had the Legislature intended the statute to provide 
immunity for injuries arising out of incarceration "any place where a person is legally 
8 
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confined," it would not have included the specific examples of a state prisons and jails in 
the language of the statute. 
C. The Cases Cited By the State Involved Physical Facilities Operated By 
the State as Places of Legal Confinement. 
In line with its effort to write "place of legal confinement" out of the statute, the 
State relies on a series of cases that focused on the question of "incarceration" rather than 
"place of legal confinement," because the latter requirement was clearly satisfied. Those 
cases are therefore entirely inapposite to this case. 
The State relies heavily on Pace v. St. George City Police Dept., 2006 UT App. 
494, 153 P.3d 789, in which the Court of Appeals held that the State retained immunity 
because the injured party was not free to leave, was under police control, and was injured 
in a police station. Id. at f 7. The State focuses exclusively on one portion of that 
opinion, however, wherein the Court of Appeals stated that "incarceration" meant that a 
person "cannot be released without some kind of permission." Id at f^ 6. Ignoring the 
other necessary elements of the Court's opinion, the State extrapolates from that single 
sentence to claim that as long as a person "cannot be released without some kind of 
permission," then wherever that person may be is a "place of legal confinement" 
sufficient to retain immunity. 
The State's argument fails for two basic reasons. First, as with the other cases 
relied upon by the State, the injury in Pace arose out of incarceration in a police station, 
which is precisely the type of "place of legal confinement" intended by the immunity 
statute. Id. at Tf 2. Thus, the relevant inquiry in this case - what constitutes a "state 
9 
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prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement" - was simply not at issue 
in Pace. Second, assuming that Mr. Peck in this case was "incarcerated," or involuntarily 
held, then the question here, which is not addressed by Pace, or by the State in its brief, is 
whether the incarceration occurred in a "place of legal confinement" as that term is used 
in the statute. In Pace, the police station plainly was such a place - in the present case, 
the public parking lot just as plainly was not. 
The other cases relied upon by the State are similarly distinguishable. None of the 
cases involving the relevant statute turned on the definition of "other place of legal 
confinement," as all of the claims asserted therein indisputably arose out incarceration in 
a physical facility operated by the State for purposes of legal confinement. See, e.g., 
Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1971) (claims arose out of decedent's 
incarceration in a state mental hospital); Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976) 
(claims arose out of incarceration in a prison when state prisoner escaped and harmed 
plaintiff); Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (claims arose out of 
incarceration in state prison when prisoner harmed plaintiff while being escorted from 
prison to Hall of Justice); Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978) (claims arose from 
prisoner's death following surgery in state prison hospital). Unlike each of the foregoing 
cases, it is undisputed that Mr. Peck was never incarcerated in any physical facility, and 
the distinction is important. 
In accordance with its unduly broad interpretation of the immunity statute, the 
State claims that the purpose of the statute is "to protect the State's efforts to maintain 
10 
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control of those individuals in state custody." Applt. Brief, p. 11. The actual purpose for 
retaining immunity under this provision is narrower - to protect the State from liability 
for harm caused by or to people it has incarcerated in the controlled environment of a 
place of legal confinement. The State creates the controlled environment of a place of 
legal confinement, and once a person is placed in such an environment, the State has 
done what is reasonably expected of it. Until a person is brought to that controlled 
environment, however, it is the State's duty to exercise reasonable care to protect that 
person and others until he or she can be incarcerated in the controlled environment of a 
place of legal confinement. Accordingly, the purpose for the retention of immunity was 
not met in this case and the trial court was correct to deny the State's efforts to expand 
the immunity statute by eliminating the specific "place of legal confinement" 
requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court examined the plain language of the statute and correctly ruled that 
Mr. Peck's injury did not arise out of "incarceration in a state prison, county, or city jail, 
or other place of legal confinement," and denied the State's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. Accordingly, the order of the trial court should be affirmed. 
665 :366881 vl 
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Respectfully submitted this^fda(y of August, 2007. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &McCARTHY 
X J 
\j^j\^y 
&rt J. Johnsen 
Chandler P. Thompson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS PECK, aka Thomas Joseph Peck, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, and THE UTAH 
HIGHWAY PATROL, 





Plaintiff complains of Defendants and alleges as follows: 
1. This action is brought pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, 
including but not limited to Utah Code sections 63-30d-101 through 904. U.C.A. (2004). The 
cause of action arose prior to the enactment of the 2004 revisions of the Governmental Immunity 
Act and thus the provisions of Utah Code sections 63-30-1 et seq may govern this claim. This 
cause of action is against the State of Utah and its agents/or political subdivisions, the Utah 
Highway Patrol and its officers (hereinafter jointly referred to as Defendants), to recover 
damages Plaintiff has suffered to the extent and in the manner hereinafter more particularly set 
forth. 
2. Plaintiff at all times pertinent to this action is and was a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and the events complained of in this action occurred in Davis County, 
State of Utah. 
3. At all times pertinent to this action the State of Utah, through its Utah Highway 
Patrol, was the employer of the officers involved. At all times pertinent to this action, the 
employees of the Utah Highway Patrol were the agents of the State of Utah. 
4. Jurisdiction for a claim against the State of Utah is with the district court. Utah 
Code§63-30d-501. 
5. Venue is properly in Salt Lake County. Utah Code §63-30d-502(l). 
6. Pursuant to the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, a Notice of Claim 
was properly served on Defendants on September 16, 2003, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A, and by reference, made a party hereof. More than 90 days have elapsed since such 
service of the claim, and pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the claim is deemed to be denied 
and Plaintiff may proceed with this action. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. At all times complained of herein, Trooper William R. Shrader, Jr. and Trooper 
Justin Hansen were employees of Defendants, State of Utah, through its Utah Highway Patrol 
Department and as employees were agents of Defendant, State of Utah. 
8. An incident involving Plaintiff and Defendants took place on September 17, 2004. 
9. Defendants created an Incident Report collectively identified as Case No. 03-02-
01473. 
Peck v. State of Utah; UHP 2 
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10. Plaintiff refused the request of Defendants to submit to testing for alcohol. 
11. Defendants placed Plaintiff under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Pursuant to the decision to arrest Plaintiff, Defendants assumed control of Plaintiff by placing 
Plaintiff in handcuffs behind his back. 
12. Defendants stood Plaintiff in front of the Highway Patrol vehicle while space for 
Plaintiff to be seated in the rear of the vehicle was cleared. 
13. Plaintiff turned around so as to not face the vehicle. 
14. Defendants physically attempted to make Plaintiff face the vehicle, shouted at 
Plaintiff and took physical action to force Plaintiff to face the vehicle. 
15. Plaintiff shouted in reply to Defendants at which time Defendants appeared to 
take physical actions to place Plaintiff on the ground, but in so doing lost physical control of 
Plaintiff which resulted in Plaintiff falling to the ground on his face. 
16. Plaintiff was unable to take any preventive or protective action to break his fall 
because his hands were handcuffed behind his back. 
17. Plaintiff suffered severe trauma and injuries to his face and head as a result of the 
fall. 
18. Plaintiff was transported by ambulance to the Davis Hospital and Medical Center 
in Layton, Utah where he received emergency room treatment. Plaintiff was diagnosed with 
concussion and received approximately 45 stitches in his forehead and ear for the lacerations he 
received when his head and face hit the pavement. 
Peck v. State of Utah, UHP 
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19. Plaintiff incurred medical expenses in excess of $4,500.00 to Davis Hospital and 
Medical Center in Layton, Utah, Clearfield Ambulance, and Associates Radiology. 
20. Plaintiff has suffered permanent scarring and disfigurement as a result of the fall. 
21. Plaintiff has received medical examinations and diagnoses regarding the 
possibility of plastic surgery to reduce the visibility of the scars on his head and ear, which 
medical expenses alone are estimated between $500.00 and $950.00, plus surgical facility 
charges, prescriptions, and the estimated time lost from employment in order to undergo and 
recover from the plastic surgery. 
22. Plaintiff has incurred medical costs and expenses from various medical care 
providers for the injuries he received as a result of the fall, which costs and expenses currently 
exceed $4,800.00 are continuing as of the date of filing this action. 
23. Plaintiff is continuing to receive medical examinations and testing to determine 
the full extent of the permanent damages he suffered as a result of the fall, and has incurred 
medical expenses in excess of $3,200.00 for diagnostic testing and examinations. Plaintiff has 
farther received an estimate of approximately $35,000.00 for the surgical expenses necessary in 
order to remedy the permanent injuries to Plaintiffs spine which were received as a result of the 
fall. In addition to the surgical expense, approximately $15,000.00 is estimated for other 
associated medical costs, and the loss of earnings in order to obtain and recover from the surgery. 
24. Plaintiff seeks leave herein to amend his Complaint from time to time and as 
medical expenses accrue and as Plaintiffs injuries attain their maximum medical recovery status. 
Peck v. State of Utah, UHP 4 
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25 Plaintiff has experienced significant physical pain and mental anguish and will, m 
reasonable probability, continue to do so m the future by reason of the nature and severity of his 
injuries and disfigurement 
26 Plaintiff believes that his damages exceed the maximum damages recoverable as 
limited by Utah Code section 63-30d-604 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
Negligence 
27 Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations of 
paragraphs 1 through 26 
28 Defendants, through its agents and employees had a duty to the genera] public, 
and specifically to Plaintiff herein when Defendants took Plaintiff into custody and placed him in 
handcuffs behind his back Defendants5 duty was to use the degree of care and caution which an 
ordinary reasonable and prudent person would use under the circumstances. 
29 Defendants negligently breached that duty to Plaintiff when Defendants 
physically forced Plaintiff to the ground and in the course thereof allowed Plaintiff to fall to the 
ground on his face 
30 As a proximate result of Defendants' breach of its duty to use the degree of care 
and caution which an ordinary reasonable and prudent person would use under the 
circumstances, Plamtiff suffered severe trauma and injunes to his face and head The failure and 
breach of the duties on the part of Defendants, as above descnbed, resulted in and were the 
proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries 
Peck v State of Utah, UHP 
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31. Defendants negligently and with knowledge of the dangers and hazards which 
existed, violated its duty to Plaintiff to physically safeguard him while exercising immediate 
physical control of Plaintiff, and thereby created or maintained an unreasonable risk of bodily 
harm and injury to Plaintiff, by negligently allowing him to fall on his face, and by failing in this 
regard, said Defendants were negligent and are liable to Plaintiff for his injuries, which were 
proximately caused as a result of said negligence. 
32. As a result of the injuries received by Plaintiff which were proximately caused by 
Defendants' negligence, Plaintiff endured permanent disability, pain and suffering which is 
continuing, disfigurement, embarrassment, humiliation, loss of wages and employment, and has 
incurred medical expenses and has the need for continuing medical care and treatment resulting 
in continuing medical expenses. Plaintiff has suffered special damages in such sums as will be 
proven at the time of trial. 
33. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' negligence, Plaintiff has suffered 
economic losses, including loss of earnings, past lost earnings to date, future lost earning 
capacity, and may include other lost employee benefits, for a total economic loss exceeding the 
sum of $50,000.00. The precise sum of said losses shall be proven at the time of trial. 
34. As a proximate result of Defendants' negligence, Plaintiff has sustained general 
damages by way of pain and suffering, and will continue to endue the same in the future. As a 
result of his injury and permanent scarring, he has suffered extreme emotional stress and is 
unable to perform duties in connection with his vocation and job, all to his loss in such sums as 
may be proven at the time of trial. 
Peckv State of Utah, UHP g 
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35. Plaintiff was emotionally traumatized by the event of his injury and consequent 
loss of activities, all to his damage in such sums as may be proven at trial. 
36. Plaintiffs injuries required transportation to the Davis Hospital and Medical 
Center in Layton, Utah where he received emergency treatment, was diagnosed with a 
concussion, and received approximately 45 stitches in his forehead and ear for the lacerations he 
received when he fell face forward on the pavement. The injuries received from this fall include 
possible permanent brain damage manifested by physical impairment, and permanent scaring and 
disfigurement. Specific medical expenses have been incurred to date in the amount of 
$13,450.00 and medical expenses are continuing to accrue as Plaintiff continues to receive 
medical care and treatment and medical testing to determine the complete extent and nature of 
the injuries suffered on September 17, 2002. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF REQUESTS RELIEF AND JUDGMENT against 
Defendants as follows: 
1. For medical expenses and other special damages as may be proven at the time of 
trial. 
2. For economic losses, loss of earnings to the date of trial, future lost earning 
capacity, which may include lost bonuses, employee benefits in such sums as may be proven at 
trial. 
Peck v. State of Utah; UHP 
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3. For a judgment of genera] losses by way of pain and suffering, embarrassment 
and humiliation and disfigurement and permanent impairment and restriction in such sums as 
may be proven at the time of trial. 
4. For prejudgment interest as may be appropriate on the portion of Plaintiff s losses 
as allowed by law, together with costs and such other relief as the Court may determine 
reasonable under all the premises. 
DATED this J J ^ d a y of Decembe^2^04. 
RlC?6vlANilICHMAN & JOHNSON, LLC 
Plaintiffs Address: 
2336 Cavalier Dr. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Peckv State of Utah; UHP 
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EXHIBIT A 
Barbara W Richman Attorneys at Law 
Bart J Johnsen* 
Iso admitted California 60 South 600 E a s t Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Phone(801)532-8844 
FAX (801) 596-8285 
BJormsenR]chmanLaw@msnxom 
September 16,2003 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
State of Utah 
Office of the Attorney General 
Mark Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Thomas J. Peck v. State of Utah, Utah Highway Patrol 
Incident date September 17, 2002, case number 03-03-01473 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 63-30-1 l(3)(a), this letter shall serve as notice of a 
claim by Thomas J. Peck against the State of Utah, Utah Highway Patrol. 
Mr. Peck's claim arises from an incident where he was injured during his arrest on September 
17, 2002. Mr. Peck claims that the officers involved negligently caused him injuries. Mr. Peck claims 
damages for personal injury from the officers' negligent actions. 
The facts of the incident are as follows and are documented within the videotape of the 
incident taken by the machine in the trooper's patrol vehicle. Mr. Peck was being investigated for 
suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. Two officers of the Utah Highway Patrol were 
involved in the investigation. Trooper William R. Shrader, Jr. was the reporting officer with Trooper 
Justin Hansen as the assisting officer. (See enclosed incident reports.) 
Trooper Shrader engaged Mr. Peck in a discussion during which Trooper Shrader requested 
Mr. Peck to submit to testing for alcohol. Mr. Peck refused Trooper Shrader's request for testing and 
at that time, Trooper Shrader placed Mr. Peck in handcuffs. Mr. Peck was placed in front of Trooper 
Shrader's vehicle while Trooper Shrader cleared room in the backseat for Mr. Peck to be transported 
to jail. Mr. Peck turned around so as to not face the vehicle. At that time, Trooper Hansen physically 
attempted to make Mr. Peck face the vehicle. Trooper Hansen turned Mr. Peck back to face Trooper 
Shrader's vehicle and began shouting at Mr. Peck. Mr. Peck shouted in reply at Trooper Hansen at 
which time Trooper Hansen appeared to take physical actions to place Mr. Peck on the ground but in 
doing so apparently lost his grip on Mr. Peck resulting in Mr. Peck's fall to the ground on his face 
W W W L A W Y E R S . C O M / U T A H R I C H M A N L A W 
State of Utah 
Office of the Attorney Genera] 
Mark Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
September 16, 2003 
Page 2 
where he suffered severe head injuries. Because Mr. Peck's hands were handcuffed behind his back, 
he was unable to break his fall and landed directly on his face. 
Mr. Peck was transported by ambulance to the Davis Hospital and Medical Center in Layton, 
Utah where he received emergency room treatment. Mr. Peck was diagnosed with concussion and 
received approximately 45 stitches in his forehead and ear for the lacerations he received from the 
pavement. Mr. Peck was subsequently discharged from the hospitaJ and transported to the Davis 
County Jail where he was booked. 
Mr. Peck's claim against the State of Utah and the Utah Highway Patrol is for negligence 
arising from the trooper's failure to exercise appropriate care in ensuring that Mr. Peck did not receive 
injuries during his arrest. Mr. Peck suffered bodily injury from the incident. 
Mr. Peck's damages are continuing to accrue and include, so far, approximately $4,454.62 in 
direct medical expenses from the emergency room treatment as well as possible permanent brain 
damage and permanent scarring and disfigurement. (See enclosed medical expenses.) Ongoing 
testing for permanent damages, including brain damage is scheduled and thus the full extent of the 
permanent damages to Mr. Peck has not yet been determined. 
Based upon the circumstances of this case, Mr. Peck believes that his damages exceed the 
maximum damages recoverable as limited by Utah Code Annotated section 63-30-34 and thus he 
submits this claim for the maximum amount of damages recoverable pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated section 63-30-34. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Sincerely yours, 
W O ^ ^ ^ ^ C I I M A N , L.L.C 
^WrjomSEN 
Attorney for Thomas J. Peck 
BJ/ 
Enc. 
cc: Thomas J. Peck 
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Party Identification (Attach additional sheets as necessary) 
PL AJNTIFF/PETITI ONER 
Name Thomas Peck 
Address 2336 Cavalier Dr 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 




ATTY FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER 
Name Bart J Johnsen 
Address 60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Day Time Telephone (801) 532-8844 
ATTY FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER 
Name 
Address 
Day Time Telephone Day Time Telephone 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT ATTY FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
Name State of Utah Name 
Address c/o Office of Attorney General Addiess 
State Capitol Complex, East Bldg, Ste. 320 




ATTY FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
Name 
Address 
Day Time Telephone 
OTAL CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 
$ 
Day Time Telephone 
JURY DEMAND 
LI] Yes • No 
CHEDULE OF FEES: §78-7-35. CHECK ANY THAT APPLY. 
(See Case Types for Filing Fees for Complaints other than Claim for Damages.) 
— COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES — 
$45 Q Small Claims: $2000 or less 
$70 Q Small Claims: $2001-$7500 
$50 Q Civil or Interpleader: $2000 or less 
$95 Q Civil or Interpleader: $2001 -
$9999 
155 Q Civil or Interpleader- $ 10,000 and 
over 
155 El Civil Unspecified 
MISCELLANEOUS -
$75 13 Jury Demand 
$2 Q Vital Statistics §26-2-25 
Effective 05/03/04 
ase Type (Check Only One Category) 




































Administrative Agency Review 
Small Claims Trial de Novo 






Expungement (Fee is $0 under 
circumstances of §77-18-10(2)) 
Forcible Entry and Detainer 







Post Conviction Relief: Capital 












Common Law Marriage 
Custody/Visitation/Support 
Divorce/ Annulment 
L) Check if child support, custody or 
visitation will be part of decree 
Paternity 
Separate Maintenance 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act (UCCJA) 

























































Abstract of Foreign Judgment or 
Decree 
Abstract of Judgment or Order of Utah 
Court/Agency 
Abstract of Judgment/Order of Utah 
State Tax Commission 





Estate Personal Rep - Formal 









Administrative Search Warrant 
Arbitration Award 
Criminal Investigation Search Warrant 
Deposit of Will 
Determination of Competency in 
Criminal Case 
Extradition 
Foreign Probate or Child Custody 
Document 
Hospital Lien 
Judicial Approval of Document not 
part of a Pending Case 
Notice of deposition in out-of-state 
case 
Open Sealed Record 
Effective05/03/04 
ADDENDUM B 
UTAH HIGHWAY PAT KUL 
INCIDENT REPORT 
Ives D Physical Custody Arrest* D Warrant Service* D Stolen Vehide* D Drugs' 
D Contraband Search D Vehicle Impound* D Weapons* D Pursuit 
D Vehicle/Property Inventory* D Evidence Seized* D Citizen Assist D Other Medical on DUI 
D DUJ Report Attached D Accident Report Attached *Requires Supplemental Fact Sheet 
2- OIM73 
Post 336) at of 
Incident Date 
9/17/02 
Incident Times I Notification 
12002 
Amval Completed 
.ank & Name) 
en, Justin 
Farmmgton, UT 64025 







Business Telephone J 
292-3304 J 
k & Name) 
er Rick 




Business Telephone j 
447-8120 
Office Address ] 
631 North Lagoon Dr, PO Box 618, Farmington, UT 84025 | 
SUBJECTS 
t Number J 0 Arrested & Booked into Jail 
Place of incarceration 
Davis County Jail 
Middle 
r 
0 Adult DJuvemle | 
Driver License & Slate 
Sex Race 











anor Crtabon Issued • Case Referred 
To 
Alias 
Weight Eye Color Hair Color 
Zip Residence Phone 
Employer Phone 
_ 
WITNESSES & VICTIMS: None 
VEHICLES: None 
NARRATIVE 
9-17-02 I responded to the Tesoro gas station at SR-193 just off the 336 off ramp to back Trooper Shrader on a 
While at the Tesoro Trooper Shrader took a suspect into custody for possible DUI After struggling with suspect 
lutes the suspect was taken to the ground for my safety, while going down he hit his head on a cement parking 
jspect was taken to the Davis Regional Hospital 
I responded to the Tesoro gas station at SR 193 just off the 336 off ramp to back Trooper Shrader on a possible 
arrival I observed Trooper Shrader speaking with an individual As I approached Trooper Shrader was 
erform the Standardized Field Sobnety Tests on the individual The suspect was being very belligerent and not 
)nce Trooper Shrader placed the suspect into handcuffs he instructed him to stand in front of his vehicle 
rader began to dear his front seat in order to transport the suspect to jail I stood at the front of Trooper 
Continued on next page... 
- w m w 9 M~~% I 
INCIDENT REPORT 
Page 2 
NARRATIVE (Continued from previous page) 
rs vehicle by the suspect. I instructed the suspect not to move and just stand there. After a few moments the suspect 
to walk off, I took his arm and put him back in front of the car. During this time the suspect was just talking. Then he 
to walk off again, I took his arm again and explained that I had just given him his last warning not to move again and 
im if he understood. He said yes sir and then shouted to "quit goddamn swinging me." 
the second verbal warning the suspect started to walk towards me pushing me with his body. I had to physically stop 
i going at me. Again I stated that he should not move and that I was not going to tell him again. When he started at me 
'ecided to take him to the ground for my safety. With the weather and the recent severe rain storm the cement parking 
ery slick. When I began to take him to the ground my feet began to stip, when I began to slip I was unable to hold 
D that he would no\ hit the ground very hard. 
the suspect was going down, with my feet slipping and his momentum we did a 180 degree turn. When he was 
he ground his head hit the comer of a parking stall divider, causing him to be knocked out The suspect also 
3 laceration to his forehead. I immediately told Trooper Shrader to call for medical and ran to my car for my first aid 
egan to administer first aid on the suspect. 
pproximately 1 minute he began to wake up and fight us again. With our training we knew that this combatative 
netimes occurred with head injuries. While I continued to administer first aid Trooper Shrader began to take his 
off. By this time the suspect was very combative and first aid was extremely difficult. We kept trying to calm him 
Hling him to lay down and that we were trying to help him. There were now several people watching the events 
er a few minutes of being called the paramedics arrived on scene. 
e paramedics arrived all medical treatment was turned over to them, the suspect was transported to the Davis 
ospital While the suspect was being transported to the hospital Trooper Shrader and myself located his car on the 
1
 on ramp of SR-15 336. The vehicle had been crashed and left there by the suspect. We conducted a property 
nd a state tax impound on the vehicle. 
the night I stayed in contact with Trooper Shrader for up dates on the suspects condition. After several hours the 
sonnel cleared the suspect, at which he was transported to the Davis County Jail by Trooper Shrader. 
JUS: D Open D Closed D Other: D Referred to Other Agency: 
D Witness Statement - Number: 
D Computer Printouts-Number: 
D Tav ImnoijpcLForm 
D < 
dumber: rirr 
Form * urulF 
Q j / ^ L J 
Reporting Officer's Signatui X / > * * 
accurate: (
 J^^~ 
(Sergeant /} , Data , I Lieutenant 
D HQ / U Section D County Attorney D 
D Photographs-Number Rolls: 
D Misdemeanor Citation 
^^ >perty Receipt 
Date 
Lieutenant 
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ident Involves. 0 Physical Custody Arrest* 
D Contraband Search 
0 VehicJe/Property Inventory*" 
0 DUI Report Attached 
D Warrant Service* D Stolen Vehicle* D Drugs* 
0 Vehicle Impound* D Weapons* D Pursuit 
D Evidence Seized* D Citizen Assist D Other 






Incident Times Notificabon ( A r r r v a f C o m p l e t e d 
1942 1942 109/18/2002 03 00 
193 (Ref Post 1) at 1 10ths/Mile East of 1-15 
Zfm*$&..< *.x:x\,p\: W \ \ • REPORT1NO OFFICER JNFORMATiGN^^ 
•rfcng Trooper (Rank & Name) 1 Badge Number 
oper Shrader. William R Jr 1434 
»Address 
Norih Lagoon Dr., PO Box 618. Farminglon, UT 84025 
cj'vx '^v> J \ ^ 
Bureau 
1 
i'i\ r ' * ' * / * ~<*v 





ting Officer (Rank &. Name) 






h Highway Patrol Section 3 Distnct A 
Office Address 
631 North Lagoon Dr., PO Box 618. Farminqton. UT 84025 






AS COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPT 
tmg Officer (Rank A Name) 
»uty JENSEN. 
/ IS COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPT j 
[ Office Address 






800 S STATE ST, FARMINGTON 84025, UT 
' '*.>>' •,-viV:' £ i . # V ^ \ ' ** i ,\-** 
^^^M^^Bii^X0^^^^M^s> :£ >^\i« V *>vs? 
/s of Subject Number: J_ 0 Arrested & Booked into Jail 
Place of Incarceration* 
DCSO 
D Misdemeanor Citation Issued 
Citation No 














0 Adult QJuvenile | 






I Mustache, Marks, Tattoos, Etc 
Crty 





















Ivement: 0 Wrtness 
(First) 
i 
nee Address Street 
J Wildflower 
•edby 
D Complainant D Victim 






Witness Statement Attached: 0 Yes D 

































[2676 W 6000 S, Roy, UT 84067 
VenlcJa Impounded 
0 Yes D No 
State Tax 









D Improper Registration 
• Other. 
D No Utah Registration D Expired Registration D Theft 0 DUI • Abandoned Possible Thef 
terwcle Status no Impound HoW on Vehicle 
Removed 
Reason for Hold 
f^e>?feM f^e"'j NARRATIVE 
ynopsis: 
in 09-17-02 at approximately 1940 hours, I was called to an accident on northbound 1-15 on ramp from SR-193. I met the 
iver (Mr. Thomas Peck) and the witness (Foley) at the Tesoro Gas Station on SR-193 just East of 1-15. I determined the c 
be intoxicated and arrested him for D.U.L Peck resisted arrest and received injuries while gaining control of him. Peck w 
sated for his injuries by Paramedics and a doctor at the hospital. The vehicle that Peck was driving was impounded and F 
as booked in the Davis County Jail. 
irrative: 
On 09-17-02 at approximately 1940 hours, Davis County Dispatch received a call from a witness (Mr. David Foley) of a 
ilcle that slid off the northbound on ramp of 1-15 from SR-193. The witness stated that the driver was walking from his ca 
/ards Tesoro Gas Station on SR-193. I was dispatched to the scene and arrived at Tesoro at approximately 1942 hours. 
I met Foley at the gas pumps outside the station. He advised me that the driver acted intoxicated and was inside the stoi 
;ing to the attendants. I asked Foley about the conditions of the vehicles. He stated that his was near the on ramp and th 
other was inside a ditch off the on ramp to 1-15. I found the driver inside Tesoro Station paying for a cup of coffee. I aski 
driver to come with me outside where I could talk with him. I observed that he had a difficult time walking straight and th 
eyes were red and droopy. His speech was loud, slurred and he smelled of alcohol. I asked him what had happened an< 
lad his drivers license with him. 
ie identified himself with a valid Utah Drivers License as Mr. Thomas J. Peck. Peck said that he lost control of his car. I 
>d him to set his coffee down so I could determine wether he was impaired or not. Peck told me twice that he was impair 
led on my video camera to record the conversation. I asked if he was alright and if he was taking any medications. Pec: 
that he takes Paxel but did not have it on him. I told Peck to blow in the palm of my hand. I could smell that the odor of 
10I was definitely on his breath. 
I approximately 1944 hours, Trooper Hansen arrived on scene to assist me. I took Mr. Peck in front of my patrol car to 
d the field sobriety tests that I was planning on giving to Mr. Peck. While patting him down for weapons, I noticed that 
s front pants zipper was down. I asked him about it and he was unaware and zipped it up. I asked Peck to hold his hec 
o that I could look at his eyes for Nystagmus. Peck said "no" and turned his head to his right, away from me while still 
ig at me with his left eye. For a about two seconds or so, I watched Pecks left eye show distinct nystagus with three tic 
eck refused to cooperate with any other testing. Based upon the accident, witness statement, his demeanor, balance,, 
speech and his eye, I determined that Peck was under the influence of alcohol. At approximately 1951 hours I arreste( 
»r D.U.I, and placed him in hand cuffs. 
INCIDENT REPORT Page 
NARRATIVE (Continued, from previous page) 
I asked Mr Foley to fill out a witness statement of the fact that he observed. Foley stated that he watched the Subaru m 
ide with a white truck beside it on SR-193 and then travel on the right shoulder of SR-193 nearly to the on ramp. I askec 
oper Hansen to place Peck in front of my patrol vehide and watch him while I cleared room for him on the front right sec 
ed dispatch to check for any prior D.U.I.'s. Dispatch stated that there were three pnors on Mr. Peck Trooper Hansen 
ructed Peck several times to stand still and not to move. I watched Peck walk away about three times as Hansen would 
k by the arms and place him back in front of the patrol car. I was just about through when I observed Trooper Hansen 
ggle with Mr. Peck again, this time Peck was resisting Trooper Hansen as he placed his hands on him Trooper Hansen 
ided to take Peck to the ground to gain control of him. The concrete was wet from the rain at the time. As Trooper Hans 
i Peck around, Pecks feet slipped out from underneath him and he fell head first on the ground, striking his forehead or 
ent and went unconscious Trooper Hansen immediately went to his patrol car for him E.M.T. jump kit to administer first 
at 1953 hours, I advised dispatch to send medical. Peck was lying prone on the ground with his hands cuffed behind hii 
c was bleeding from a laceration on his forehead. Trooper Hansen attempted to stop the bleeding by applying gauze 
iages to his head. Trooper Hansen and I were not sure how extensive the injury was and I decided to uncuff Peck \ncas 
eeded to be rolled over on his back. Peck was in and out of consciousness and was rolling around. He was making it 
ult to uncuff him but I decided that Trooper Hansen and I could hold him on the ground while waiting for medical to arm 
t approximately 1956 hours Davis County Paramedics (Deputies Jensen and Eruch) and Clearfield Ambulance #42 
3d. Peck was conscious at this time but not completely alert. Peck was struggling with the Paramedics as they placed hi 
back board and strapped him down. I gathered the information sheet from the witness and spoke to the cashier at the 
>n. She stated that Mr. Peck was rude and smelled like alcohol. I asked Deputy Jensen if Peck was going to be transpoi 
ivis North Hospital and told him that this was a felony D.U.I.. Deputy Jensen asked if I needed a blood draw at the hosp 
him that I did. 
Irove to the abandoned vehicle (burgundy Subaru station wagon) on northbound 1-15 and began the impound. I called 1 
County Dispatch to arrange for a tow while I checked the car for any wants and performed an inventory. At approximat 
hours, J.P.'s Towing arrived and removed the Subaru along with a state tax. I drove to Davis North Hospital and met M 
He was a sleep and waiting to be taken in for x-rays. I advised the nurse that before they released him they needed to 
me so that I could be there and take him into custody. At about 2245 I received notice from dispatch that Mr.Peck was 
to be released. I obtained a copy of the release form for the jaH and placed peck in my patrol car. I transported Peck to 
3vis County Jail and read him his rights while in the Sally Port. Peck refused to answer questions regarding the intervie 
on of the D.U.I, form. I booked him in on a 3rd degree felony D.U.I, resisting arrest and unsafe lane travel. 
nt Status: D Open 0 Closed D Other D Referred to Other Agency. 
ments: D Witness Statement - Number: D Photographs-Number Rolls: 
rant(s)-Number. D Computer Printouts-Number: 
uft Data Form D Tax Impound Form D Misdemeanor Citation 
ram D ( / /) D Property Receipt 
Reporting Officer's Signatu , ~ ^~ / J/ Date 
Dort is accurate: , UK SU^v^ 9/18/02 3:00:00 AM 
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PHYSICAL CUSTODY ARREST 
1 Statute Violated [Charge 




unsafe lane travel, 
Subj 
1 ] 
Statute Violated j Charge 
76-8-305 [resisting arrest, 
